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Telecommunications Policymaking in 
Japan 
The 1980s and beyond 
Roya Akhavan-Majid 
 
 
The major law which provided for the privatization of Nippon Telegraph and 
Telephone (NTT) in 1984 is up for review by the Japanese government in April 
1990. Given the continuing domination of Japan's telecommunications market by 
NTT, ultimate divestiture of the privatized NTT remains a likely outcome of the 
review. Against this backdrop, this study presents an analysis of the forces which 
have shaped Japan's privatization and liberalization policy throughout the period 
1980-89, and are likely to lead to additional reforms in Japan's 
telecommunications system in the course of the upcoming policy review. 
 
The two major laws, the NTT Co Law and the Telecommunications Business Law, which 
provided for the privatization of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) and deregulation of 
Japan's telecommunications market in 1984 passed the Japanese Diet1 after a drawn-out process 
of bargaining and conflict resolution among major Japanese elite power groups, including NTT, 
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications (MPT) and Japan's organized big business. While the passing of the two 
laws marked the resolution of some of the primary conflicts, major issues of contention remained 
unresolved, particularly with respect to the NTT Co Law. Reflecting this precarious state of 
compromise, an amendment was added to each of the two laws requiring a review of the 
Telecommunications Business Law in 1988, and the NTT Co Law in 1990. After a preliminary 
review of the Telecommunications Business Law by MPT in March 1988, the ultimate decision 
on the fate of the law was postponed to April 1990, when the related, more controversial NTT 
Co Law is up for review.2 
Since NTT's formal privatization in 1985 the previous points of contention have 
sharpened considerably because of the unrestricted expansion of NTT into a sprawling monopoly 
and its continuing domination of Japan's telecommunications market. The upcoming review of 
the NTT Co Law in 1990 may therefore be considered to hold the promise of new reforms in 
Japan's telecommunications system. 
Against this backdrop, the purpose of this article is to present an analysis of the elite 
conflicts which have shaped Japan's privatization and deregulation policy throughout the period 
1980-89, and are likely to result in additional changes in Japan's telecommunications system. 
Before going on to discuss the policymaking process, however, let us first examine the 
interests and policy positions of the different elite power groups involved in the policy process. 
 
 
 
 
 2 
Power groups 
 
US government 
On the international level the US government has been the primary source of pressure on 
Japan to deregulate its telecommunications market. For many years US electronic manufacturers 
have sought to enter the telecommunications hardware and information services market in Japan 
with little success. The continued difficulty of entry experienced by the US manufacturers 
coupled with a ballooning US-Japan trade deficit finally led in the early 1980s to a renewed 
surge in trade friction which continues to this day. 
As a country dependent upon exports of manufactured goods for its economic survival, 
Japan is particularly vulnerable to protectionism abroad. Thus, despite its own protectionist 
practices, Japan has been sensitive to protectionist overtures abroad, particularly in the USA, and 
has often made timely concessions to keep such overtures from materializing into action.  
 Among the powerful sources of pressure on Japanese telecommunications policy in the 
1980s, therefore, has been the demand by the USA for more liberal procurement practices and 
larger purchases of US telecommunications products on the part of NTT and a more open and 
competitive information services market. 
 
Japanese big business 
 
At the national level the primary pressure towards liberalization and deregulation of 
telecommunications has been exerted by the big business leaders organized in the Japan 
Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren). As expansive businesses engaged in a 
constant search for new and lucrative markets, Japan’s leading business enterprises exerted 
pressure on the government to create favourable conditions for their entry into the 
telecommunications market. 
 Among the conditions best suited to big business interests were: 
 
• Elimination of NTT’s monopoly and permission to enter the market; 
• A broken-up (divested) NTT to ensure effective competition; 
• Privatization of NTT; 
• A deregulated market vis-à-vis domestic business; and 
• Restriction of foreign investment in the domestic telecommunications market. 
 
Of these conditions, NTT privatization and divestiture constituted two distinct policy 
elements favored by private industry for two very different reasons. 
 As far as the ability to successfully enter and compete in the data communications market 
is concerned, a divested NTT would have been far more amenable to the interests of big business 
in its efforts to obtain a share of the market than a privatized yet sprawling telecommunications 
giant, unrestricted in the scope of its activities. Thus without divestiture an ultimate privatization 
of NTT would contribute very little to creating the type of competitive market sought by private 
industry. 
Yet privatization of NTT has been favoured quite strongly by private industry, 
particularly by Japan’s leading electronics manufacturers, for an interesting set of reasons. 
Despite its leading role in technological research and development, NTT has never made 
its own equipment. Rather, it has always bought more than 80% of its equipment from Japan’s 
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top electronics manufacturers, such as Hitachi, NEC, Fujitsu, Sumitomo and Oki Electric, 
collectively referred to as NTT’s ‘family of suppliers‘.3 It has done so, furthermore, not on the 
basis of competitive bidding among the different suppliers but in a consultative process based on 
collective pricing agreements.4 With the rise in the early 1980s of Japan’s trade surplus to record 
figures, however, NTT’s procurement practices began to come under increasing scrutiny by its 
trade partners, leading to mounting pressures for greater foreign procurement. As long as NTT 
remained a public entity under government management it would, according to GATT rules, be 
bound to respond to demands for more open procurement practices. If privatized, however, it 
would be exempted from this requirement. NTT’s complete privatization could therefore benefit 
NTT’s family of suppliers by relieving NTT from its legal obligation under GATT rules to 
practise open procurement.5 
Another major advantage of NTT’s privatization for Japan’s electronics manufacturers, 
of course, would be to enable them to make a direct and profitable investment in the country’s 
telecommunications market by acquiring their own shares in the privatized company.6 
Finally, among the conditions favoured by Japan’s big business was a 
telecommunications market as restrictive as possible to foreign competition. Thus, organized in 
Keidanren, Japan’s big business lobbied for privatization and divestiture of NTT, deregulation of 
telecommunications business, and restriction of the level of foreign investment in Japan’s 
communications market. 
 
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications 
 
Japan’s Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications is the policymaking and regulatory 
body overseeing the nation’s broadcasting and telecommunications systems. MPT’s regulatory 
authority over NTT thus constitutes a major element of its bureaucratic jurisdiction and power. 
With the sudden rise of telecommunications in the early 1970s from a position of low 
priority on the national agenda to one of central importance to the nation’s economic prosperity, 
an unprecedented opportunity was created for MPT to climb the ranks of power, even to the 
point of contending with MITI for the position of Japan’s primary industrial policymaker. A 
privatized and divested NTT and a deregulated telecommunications market, however, would not 
only strip MPT of its direct supervisory authority over NTT, but it would also deprive it of its 
unique chance to expand the basis of its regulatory power. 
Thus, in addition to opposing complete deregulation in the telecommunications market, 
MPT has shown a strong interest in keeping NTT intact as a giant corporation and, in the face of 
pressures for NTT’s divestiture, has continually argued in favour of a single nationwide 
network.7 In addition, since 1979 MPT has given its wholehearted support to NTT’s idea for an 
Information Network System (INS),8 designed to handle all types of communication, including 
voice, pictures and data in digitized form using a nationwide network of optical fibers. By 
rendering any kind of duplication extremely costly and inefficient, such a system, if successful, 
could potentially establish NTT’s domination over Japanese telecommunications for many years 
to come. 
In addition to the higher level of power entailed in overseeing a large nationwide 
telecommunications entity, MPT’s preference for a unitary, as opposed to a divested, NTT may 
be considered to arise from the ease of control offered by a single giant communications network 
in times of political crisis or national emergency. 
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In response to the new demands on government telecommunication policy prompted by 
the advent of new media technologies, therefore, MPT has favoured a strong NTT and insisted 
on policies affirming its jurisdictional authority over the nation’s traditional as well as new 
telecommunications entities. 
 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
 
Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry has played a central role in 
developing Japan’s industrial policy and orchestrating the nation’s economic activities 
throughout the post-war period. With the rise into prominence of telecommunications and 
information technologies in the early 1970s, however, MITI’s continued domination of Japan’s 
economic scene has come to depend largely on its ability to take charge of the country’s 
telecommunications and related policies.9 In this context MPT’s mandated authority to regulate 
the nation’s telecommunications remains the primary obstacle in the way of MITI’s continued 
performance as Japan’s foremost economic policymaker. 
A completely deregulated telecommunications market, eliminating the basis of MPT’s 
regulatory power, and a divested NTT, allowing MITI to establish strong new competitors under 
its own administrative guidance, therefore, constitute the conditions most favourable to MITI’s 
interests. 
Thus, as it happens, MITI’s support for NTT’s privatization and divestiture and a 
liberalized telecommunications market arises not only from its solidarity with Keidanren and 
Japan’s business community, but also from the primary importance of such politics to its own 
survival as a top-ranking ministry. 
 
NTT 
 
As far as NTT itself is concerned, both the NTT President, Hisashi Shinto, and the NTT 
workers’ union, Zendetsu, supported the call for NTT’s privatization. 
Throughout the privatization and deregulation policy debate Hisashi Shinto acted as a 
strong spokesman for reforming Japanese telecommunications, arguing particularly for the need 
to free NTT from the cumbersome process of government supervision so that it could better 
respond to the demands of the new technology and the rapidly changing telecommunications 
environment.10 
Although not a strong influence on policy, Zendetsu also supported the initiatives for 
NTT’s privatization. As public employees, NTT workers did not have the right to strike. More 
importantly, the amount of annual wage increase they could expect was closely tied to that of 
other public enterprise employees, including those of such faltering enterprises as Japan National 
Railways (JNR).11 This meant that no matter how profitable NTT might be, those profits could 
not be translated into wage increases for NTT workers as long as Japan’s other major public 
corporation was beset with a ballooning deficit. By separating their fortunes from that of other 
public employees, NTT’s privatization would allow the NTT workers to ask for and receive 
higher wage increases. The NTT workers’ union, therefore, actively lobbied for privatization in 
the course of the policy process. 
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Policymaking process 
 
Among the most popular policies of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) since the late 
1970s has been the general policy of ‘administrative reform’12 aimed at trimming the fat and 
increasing the efficiency of Japan’s numerous public corporations. This policy has been 
particularly popular because of its original emphasis on the need for reorganizing JNR, a public 
corporation considered by a majority of the Japanese public as a symbol of costly and inefficient 
operation. Running deeper into the red every year, JNR has been one of the most visible targets 
of the policy of administrative reform, and the primary source of the policy’s widespread public 
support. 
It was within the context of this favourable climate that Keidanren, in alliance with MITI, 
launched its campaign for the privatization of NTT. At the time when the campaign began NTT 
was, as it still is, a highly profitable organization which not only did not rely on any government 
funds but actually paid an average of 120 billion yen annually to the government in ‘excess 
profits’.13 The generalized support for the policy of administrative reform, however, provided an 
ideal pretext for the proponents of competition in the telecommunications market to focus 
attention on NTT and argue for its reorganization. The publicly expressed logic of the argument 
was that, being a public corporation, NTT is susceptible to increasing inefficiency in its 
operation and thus, despite its present profitability, could begin to tax the public budget at some 
future point in time.14 
The formal process of governmental policymaking leading to the enactment of two major 
laws addressing the reorganization of NTT and the future of the telecommunications business in 
Japan began in March 1981 with the launching of the Second Ad Hoc Council on Administrative 
Reform by Prime Minister Suzuki.15 
Despite its formal character as a governmental committee, the Council was from the 
beginning under the direct influence of Keidanren. Among the most visible signs of this was the 
fact that the Council, appointed by the Prime Minister, was headed by the then Keidanren 
President, Toshio Doko, the founder of Toshiba and one of Japan’s most influential zaikai 
(business elite) members. Another sign of Keidanren influence was the concurrence of the 
council, both chronologically and in terms of its final recommendations, with the Keidanren 
Committee on Data Processing (later renamed the Committee on Information and 
Telecommunication Policy), established in 1980 under the chairmanship of the Fujitsu 
Chairman, Taiyu Kobayashi, with a mandate to formulate Keidanren policy on 
telecommunications and to draw up a proposal to be presented to the government and the ruling 
LDP. 
Four months after the launching of the Second Ad Hoc Council the Keidanren policy 
committee formally presented to the government in July 1981 its ‘Proposal for promotion of 
progress towards the Information Society’. 16 The proposal was followed by a more detailed set 
of recommendations submitted to the Second Ad Hoc Council in February 1982, advocating 
complete liberalization of the use of telecommunications and NTT privatization and divestiture.17 
A few months later, in July 1982, the Second Ad Hoc Council presented its final 
recommendations to the Prime Minister, closely reflecting the position taken by the Keidanren 
Committee on Information and Telecommunication Policy. More specifically, the Second Ad 
Hoc Council recommended: 
 
• opening the telecommunications market to private competition; 
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• turning NTT into a ‘special’ private company whose shares would initially be held by the 
government and later gradually sold to the public;18 
• divestiture of NTT within five years into a central company operating trunk lines, and 
several local companies operating local telephone services. 
 
From the beginning the recommendations made by the Second Ad Hoc Council, particularly 
those urging privatization and divestiture of NTT, met with strong opposition from MPT and its 
supporters in the LDP.19 Based upon the traditional tendency of similar institutions in Japan to 
compete with one another while joining with dissimilar groups to form self-sufficient 
heterogeneous coalitions,20 different ministries in Japan routinely coalesce with factions in the 
LDP, forming competing cluster-factions or ‘tribes’ (zoku). Thus, after the Second Ad Hoc 
Council issued its report, conflict began to grow between the so-called ‘MPT tribe’ (Yuseizoku) 
representing a coalition between MPT and the Tanaka faction in the LDP, and the ‘MITI tribe’ 
(Tsusanzoku), representing a coalition between Keidanren, MITI and the Miyazawa faction in 
the LDP.21 
Interestingly, the same factional divisions and coalitions were visible on the occasion of 
the designation of a new NTT President in 1985. The contenders for the position were the 
incumbent NTT President, Hisashi Shinto, a prominent businessman recruited from the 
shipbuilding industry to head NTT in 1981, and NTT Vice President Yasusuda Kitahara, who 
came from within the bureaucratic ranks of NTT. Originally introduced for the NTT presidency 
to Prime Minister Suzuki by Toshio Doko22 (the same Keidanren President who headed the 
Second Ad Hoc Committee), Shinto was backed by MITI, Tsusanzoku and Keidanren, while 
Kitahara was supported by MPT and Yuseizoku, the Tanaka faction of Yuseizoku in particular.23 
Following fierce infighting, the balance of power finally shifted in Shinto’s favour, mainly 
because of Tanaka’s illness, which removed him from the political scene in late 1984. 
As the first step towards achieving a possible compromise on the issue of market 
liberalization, telecommunications lines were partially liberalized in October 1982 to permit the 
establishment of small-scale value-added networks for business usage.24 In the meantime conflict 
continued to rage on the question of NTT’s privatization and divestiture, leading senior 
politicians outside the MITI and MPT ‘tribes’ to take action later in 1983 to obtain a compromise 
between the two contending cluster-factions.25 In the course of the formal and informal 
negotiations that followed, the strong opposition of MPT and its allies succeeded in freezing the 
idea of NTT divestiture for the time being. In return, however, MPT agreed in principle to 
Keidanren/MITI demands for NTT’s privatization. 
A partial compromise was thus reached between the two contending parties under the 
mediation of LDP elders based on the idea of privatizing NTT first and considering the 
desirability of its divestiture at some future date.26 
Once a basic compromise had been reached on the issue of NTT’s reorganization, the 
focus of the telecommunications policy debate shifted to the question of deregulation and the 
promotion of competition in telecommunications. 
Having partially opened the telecommunications market in October 1982 by allowing 
businesses to start small-scale value-added networks (VANs) using NTT lines, MPT proceeded 
in 1983 to draw up a set of new laws aimed at regulating the activities of the new data 
communications businesses. Once again in September 1983 conflict began to rage between the 
two cluster-factions as MITI expressed its strong opposition to the introduction of any new 
regulations.27 
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Against the backdrop of this unresolved internal conflict on the issue of 
telecommunications deregulation, the US government began to exert its own pressures on the 
Japanese government to allow foreign carriers to enter the VAN market without restriction.28 
Fearing the potential threat of competition posed to NTT by such US giants as AT&T and IBM, 
MPT insisted vigorously on the necessity for imposing some restrictions on the level of foreign 
capital invested in the new telecommunications businesses. Although motivated by a different set 
of interests, MPT’s position in this case was in line with that of Japanese businesses intending to 
enter the telecommunications market. 
Shortly after the announcement by MPT of its intention to restrict the level of foreign 
investment in Japanese telecommunications, pressures began to increase on MPT to agree to a 
compromise. Following an official meeting between the US ambassador to Japan and the 
Minister of Posts and Telecommunications in February 1984,29 and other diplomatic efforts on 
the part of the USA, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs intervened in the process, urging 
accommodation of US demands to avoid a new surge in the ongoing friction on trade issues. 
 Reflecting an ultimate compromise between the positions taken by MPT, MITI, big 
business and the US government, the final draft of the Telecommunications Business Law 
classified prospective telecommunications businesses into two categories. The first category, 
called ‘Type 1’ businesses, are those which own and operate their own telecommunications lines 
and equipment. The second category, called ‘Type 2’ businesses, are those which provide 
information services by leasing lines from NTT or other Type 1 businesses. Type 2 businesses 
are further divided into ‘ordinary’ and ‘special’ categories.30 Special Type 2 businesses are 
defined as large-scale businesses which cater to a variety of clients and provide international as 
well as domestic information services. Different levels of regulation are then applied to the 
different categories of telecommunications business, in line with the scale and scope of their 
operations. 
Of the two basic categories of telecommunications business, Type 1 businesses are more 
strictly regulated. Establishment of Type 1 businesses requires the approval of MPT. These 
businesses, furthermore, are subject to MPT supervision in various areas of their activity 
including service rates and decisions to interconnect or merge with other Type 1 businesses. 
Furthermore, MPT reserved the right not to approve applications for Type 1 businesses if it 
deems such entry to create ‘excess competition’ in the telecommunications market.31 The level of 
foreign investment in Type 1 businesses cannot exceed 30%.32 
As for the second category of telecommunication businesses, Ordinary Type 2 enterprises 
can start operation by simply notifying MPT, while Special Type 2 businesses need to ‘register’ 
with MPT, which means that they require MPT approval.33 No restriction is placed on foreign 
ownership in the case of the Type 2 businesses, reflecting a partial victory for the USA. 
Thus, through the compromise process, MPT succeeded in guaranteeing for itself some 
level of regulatory authority over new telecommunications businesses as well as in restricting 
foreign investment to a certain extent. The MITI-Keidanren coalition, on the other hand, 
succeeded in securing a certain level of liberalization and deregulation in the telecommunications 
market. 
The final draft of the NTT Co Law which passes the Diet also in April 1984 (becoming 
effective in April 1985) reflected the compromise reached in August 1983 between the 
contending parties under LDP elders’ mediation. Several provisions were added to the law, 
however, before its passage in 1984. The final draft of the NTT Co Law thus included the 
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following provisions: 
 
• NTT shall be a private company. 
• The new company shall be a joint-stock corporation. 
• In addition to domestic telecommunications business, the new company can perform 
other services and engage in other related businesses subject to MPT approval. 
• The government shall permanently hold no less than one-third of the shares in the new 
company. 
• Foreigners or foreign corporations cannot hold shares in NTT Co. 
• NTT Co shall (a) put priority on the public use of telecommunications in the case of 
disaster or national emergency, (b) invest 1-3% of its revenue in R&D, and (c) maintain a 
nationwide network. 
• NTT Co shall be subject to the authorization of the minister of MPT in the following 
aspects of its operations: (a) entering new services and business activities, (b) annual 
budget and ‘work plan’, (c) appointment and dismissal of officers, directors and auditors, 
and (d) disposition of profits and manner of investment. 
• The NTT Co Law shall be reviewed within five years after the incorporation of the new 
company.34  
 
As is strikingly clear from the provisions in the NTT Co Law, MPT’s interests held the upper 
hand in the final compromise reached on the principles of NTT’s reorganization. Not only did 
NTT remain intact as a giant corporation, but it was given the go-ahead for unlimited expansion 
into all possible kinds of related businesses. And despite privatization, not only does the 
government continue to hold the bulk of NTT shares, but almost all of the new company’s major 
business operations, including appointment of top personnel, budgeting and investment, continue 
to remain subject to MPT supervision and approval. 
 The ultimate enactment in April 1984 of the Telecommunications Business Law and the 
NTT Co Law created an ironic situation in which, while new telecommunications businesses 
were allowed to enter the market, they could scarcely hope to compete with the formidably 
powerful NTT. According to expert opinion, even at the time of its privatization NTT was so 
immense that new common carriers could at best hope to control 5-10% of the market by the 
1990s.35 As a partial response, Japanese businesses seeking to enter the telecommunications 
market as common carriers began to coalesce in joint ventures in order to share the risks entailed 
in the competition. 
 Early in 1985 three major consortia of Japan’s most powerful big businesses were formed 
as major competitors to NTT. These were: 
 
• Daini Denden Kaikaku (which roughly translates into ‘second NTT’), a joint venture by 
Sony, Mitsubishi, Kyosera. Ushio, Secom and 200 other major companies;36 
• Nihon Kosoku Tsuhin (Teleway Japan), a joint venture sponsored by the Ministry of 
Construction and Japan Highway Public Corp, with the participation of Toyota, Mitsui, 
Sumitomo, Kyosera and 44 other companies;37 
• Nihon Telecom, a joint venture by Japan National Railways, two private railway firms, 
five banks and brokers, and 156 other businesses, including Mitsubishi which has 
holdings in all of the three new carriers.38 
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As might be expected, the market has been far more active with respect to the entry of Type 
2 businesses. As of 1988 there were more than 520 Type 2 businesses operating in Japan. 
The three above-mentioned ‘alternative NTT’ ventures began operation as common 
carriers in September 1987, and provide long-distance service between Tokyo and Osaka, 
Japan’s most lucrative telecommunications route. All three plan to extend their networks to 
Kyushu in the south and to Hokkaido in the north by 1990. 
Thus far the three new carriers’ only weapon against NTT, lower prices, has failed to win 
them the market share they originally expected. This is partly due to the fact that NTT has 
promptly responded to the newcomers’ lower rates by price cuts of its own. Early in 1988, for 
example, NTT cut its long-distance rates by 10%, to offset the 20% discount offered by its 
competitors.39 
Despite the modest gains made by NTT’s competitors thus far, their collective market 
share continues to remain well below 10% of NTT’s 5 trillion yen market.40 And while the three 
newcomers remained in the red during their first two years of operation,41 NTT continued to 
increase its profits at a rate of about 30% in fiscal 198642 and 39% in fiscal 1987.43 
Not only NTT’s efficiency and profits, but also its stature and overall domain in the field 
of information and telecommunications have grown rapidly since its privatization in 1985. 
Unrestricted by the NTT Co Law as to the range of businesses it would be allowed to enter, NTT 
has rapidly diversified its activities by establishing more than 120 affiliates in joint ventures with 
major national and international businesses. Among them is a joint venture between NTT and 
IBM Japan,44 and another between NTT, three of its major suppliers, NEC, Hitachi, Fujitsu and 
one of Japan’s major media conglomerates, Nihon Keizai Shimbun.45 The joint venture with 
IBM led to an uproar on the part of Japanese big business, which saw the joining of the two 
international giants as a major blow to the interests of true competition in the market. 
Thus, despite its success in opening the telecommunications market to a rapidly 
increasing number of Type 2 businesses, the 1984 reform of Japan’s telecommunications is 
considered by many in Japan to have failed to create an environment conducive to effective 
competition, particularly with respect to common carrier businesses. 
The growing evidence in favour of the need for reconstructing NTT has subsequently 
placed the MITI-Keidanren coalition on the offensive, forcing MPT to reposition itself on the 
divesture issue. In preparing for the upcoming review of the NTT Co Law – and working under 
pressure from the proponents of an NTT break-up – the Telecommunications Council of MPT 
issued an interim report in October 1989, setting forth three options for NTT’s reorganization: 
 
• Keeping the present structure with necessary improvements; 
• Breaking up NTT; or 
• Divesting NTT of certain forms of business.46 
 
Barring a last-minute compromise between MPT and the MITI-Keidanren coalition, the 
ultimate divestiture of NTT remains a likely outcome of the upcoming review. 
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